With due respect to earlier writers and similar thoughts, I have a distinct memory of Soviet Admiral Sergei Gorshkov saying “Better is the enemy of good enough.” We tend to try to design diamonds, but as a retired naval architect with a lot of experience in USN ships, I’ll tell you that at some point you need to shoot all of the requirements bubbas and engineers, and get on with cutting steel. Diamond designs are often based on a specific set of threat requirements that have a fleeting duration - what I term a fragile design rather than a robust, rigorous design - like trying to dance on a pin point where any small change in the forcing function renders it a waste of time and national treasure.
I agree that “better” keeps becoming the standard even when “good enough for the mission” would be the more useful answer.
That was a good part of what I was getting at in. Not every ship needs to be a diamond. Sometimes it needs to be a real, buildable design with a clear purpose, controlled changes, and numbers behind it.
Before we cut steel, we need to freeze the design. Change orders will still happen, but they must be necessary to the correction of a design problem that needs to be solved rather than allowing the good idea fairy to run rampant and allow the Navy to make changes simply because there is some capability they want to add now. Modes can be made later and in most cases they will be made cheaper after the ship has been in service for a period of time.
As an Engineer, I can testify that change orders are expensive. They should be issued only when absolutely necessary.
Concur. My second ship was DD-973. Rather than make CIWS a late-add mod to the original construction contract, it became part of the post-construction SRA. Seeing that whole process and the things that had gone wrong in my first ship’s ROH are a big part of what led me to becoming an Engineering Duty Officer.
I think a primary design characteristic of all future ships should be modularity. Weapons positions should be supplied with an over abundance of power, cooling, and data connectivity and the surrounding structure designed to accommodate the highest potential load. Compatibility requirements should be pushed to the weapon system modules. Modularity could even be extended to crew compartments, under the assumption that crew size is mission dependent, and unneeded crew space could be used for other purposes.
Modularity has proven that it needs to be proven before being applied to warships. Stacking combat capability is not the same as stacking shipping containers.
Thats a good question. Looking at successful modular implementation, like StanFlex....the modules tended to be installed and stay there. Which begs the question; what did the modularity achieve? Operationally, StanFlex had a greater chance of success under the operating paradigm of Norway's Navy versus the paradigm of the US fleet. It helps that StanFlex modules themselves were relatively small modules...really more of a very large cell/magazine with extra features. Is it really worth building a ship with the tradeoffs in complexity, capability, weight, structural integrity to achieve very large structural percentage 'modularity'? That is unproven. Modularity is not a cause of the LCS issues, but it didn't help the LCS to be successful in terms of system capability. Not to mention the logistics constraints for a globally operating Navy. What happens with these modules when not installed? The USN already has a problem with maintenance/repair of assets afloat. Now throw a fleet of "modules" at that problem...modules that are not likely to be swapped out a lot, especially because there are no operating priniciples for operational module management. Even if the USN adopts and enacts a 'ready positioned module fleet' around the world...will that really achieve more from less? The Nissan Pulsar NX was sort of interesting in it's modularity concept, but in the driveway, modularity became more of a headache or an "oh yeah, I never change it".
Looking at this a little more, it looks like containerized on deck modules are becoming a thing. These include SF Defense’s “The Cube, the US MK 70 system, the future ECV, and the Naval Groups MPLS. Containers makes more sense for ease of employment on existing ships, and future ships could be designed to better accommodate a wider variety of containers with the proper electrical, cooling, power and comms capacity and connections.
I'd rather reinstate the VLS on ALL the San Antonios. The space is there. They managed to set it on fire on the USS New Orleans. And if we're giving them 16 strike-length cells, I'd not put NSM on them. I'd rather put TLAM as NSM would require them to get far too close to shore for land-attack.
I can certainly get behind the VLS on all the San Antionos to be sure. And for the LPDs operating with the big deck amphibs, I have no issue with them loading with Tomahawks, as the proposal gives those formations built-in escorts.
The author is trying to solve the problem of USN ships getting endlessly extended at sea by providing some flavor of 'gap-filler' ship that does a portion of the job that an existing ship-type provides. I would like to solve the same problem. However, I see the issue from a different standpoint.
Author sees the issue as being the use of something like an ARG or CSG to play patty-cake with local powers while sailing around. He would like to hand off the patty-cake mission to a 'lesser' ship of some sort or a 'differently configured' ship in this case. Then he would 'focus' the remaining 'heavy assets' on pure war.
I see the issue as being we don't have enough ships to do the amount of 'pure war' that we have asked them to do. What kills your ships' lifespans and wrecks your maintenance accounts is that combat typically results in ships getting extended over and over and over (See Gerry Ford.) Having more ships to 'slot in' means that you don't have your ships in-combat for as long a period.
If I have 16 carriers, that guarantees I can deploy 4 at a time. I can have possibly 4 more standing by to deploy and replace the 4 who're at war. In a fight with a small power, I'll probably use at least two and possibly 3 of those ships, and I'll have one spare. For example, the USN fought Desert Storm with 4 carriers 'on-station' continuously for months. At the same time, we had enough strength to deter the Soviets and do other things.
But we don't have that force anymore.
We can reliably muster 2 carriers with the likelihood (in a good year) of mustering a third. We don't have the back-bench needed to reliably sortie spares to replace those two carriers, which is why the carriers get extended over and over and over.
The original plan was to be able to fight two 'Desert Storms' at once but we are not even able to do that. We can realistically fight ONE Desert Storm and try to buffalo any other countries feeling froggy into not acting at that time.
And that brings me to why I do not agree with the author's concept. Building a specialized ship for the patty-cake role still leaves you only reliably able to field enough assets to MAYBE fight one Desert Storm at a time. E.g. he would let the number of 'full' carriers drop to 9. So by the 4-1 rule, you have 2 available and if the stars align favorably you might get a 3rd, though that is unlikely.
Where would I go? I would find ways to make our ships less pricey, so we can simply have more of them. I do like some of the author's ideas on trying to hold the line on cost of our ships. E.g. does everybody need full SPY-6(V1)? Does a carrier need EASR? Can we relax some of the constricting damage-control regs that killed Constellation to arrive at a cheaper hull?
Currently, a Flt 3 Burke costs upwards of $2.2billion. How much could we shave from that cost? Once upon a time, we had Burkes, Ticos, and Spru-cans. Spru-can was the low-end destroyer. Could we build a Spru-can with EASR and only 48-64 VLS to the tune of 30ish ships? Then reserve a much more limited set of high-end destroyers (say 30-40ish) for high-end jobs?
Can we build a gas-turbine powered Ford-lite with maybe two or three EMALS (something like the Fujian or the proposed PA02 version of the QE)? The Brits can run a QE with 1600 guys. They got the QEs for something like the cost of a couple of Burkes. Could we get four or five of those and get back to 16 carriers? I'd keep them in home waters and let the nuke boats do what they're doing now. If a contingency starts, I can sortie the gas-turbine ships out to the fight as backup to let the nuke boats rest. In that scenario, I can plan for the tankers to refuel them.
So, bottom line, I'm still skeptical of his concept of a 'presence ship'. He's trying to solve the problems that are eating USN maintenance and op-tempo alive, but I'd do it a different way. Still.
There’s a lot in there I agree with, especially on cost and the need for more hulls. At a certain point, if every ship is built to the highest possible standard, you end up with too few ships to do the job, and that shows up exactly in the extension and maintenance problems you’re describing.
Where I think we differ is less on the problem and more on how to solve it. I’m not looking to reduce warfighting capacity so much as change how it’s structured and used. The carrier piece is probably the clearest example. Going from 11 CVNs to 9 CVNs is not meant to accept less presence, but to pair them with CVLs and manage the force differently so you end up with more available decks and less constant extension on the nuclear ships.
Same idea applies more broadly. Some of what you’re getting at with lower-cost destroyers and holding the line on systems is very much in line with how I’m thinking about the fleet. Not everything needs to be a top-end ship if the mission doesn’t demand it.
So I think we’re actually pretty close on the underlying issues. I’m just trying to address both the size of the force and how it’s being used at the same time.
Countries when they see the Multi tool LPD in your new fleet: :)
Countries when they see any other ship in your fleet design: :o
Quick question though, maybe to be answered next week, what did you mean by "numbered fleets" when dispersing the ESB? Either way, Can't wait for the next instalment.
1st Fleet, 2nd Fleet, 3rd Fleet, etc. A numbered fleet is assigned to a major area of USN interest. E.g. the 7th Fleet is based in Japan and manages most Western Pacific-related affairs.
To the author's point, we have two geriatric command ships. The other ships have quietly aged out of the system and never been replaced.
I'm not sure using the existing ESBs is the way to go. I'd rather build a dedicated ship to do the job and leave the ESBs to their multi-tool job of supporting SOCOM and Mine Warfare, etc. We could build a few command ships off the existing (hot) ESB line, rather than taking SOCOMs toy from them. But, to the author's point, we should not be trying to run navy ops from a land facility that is getting shelled by Shaheds.
I do personally like the idea of SOCOM and the fleet command on the same ship, as the increased coordination the could result from that pairing is an advantage.
I can also see the value in your approach here as well.
With due respect to earlier writers and similar thoughts, I have a distinct memory of Soviet Admiral Sergei Gorshkov saying “Better is the enemy of good enough.” We tend to try to design diamonds, but as a retired naval architect with a lot of experience in USN ships, I’ll tell you that at some point you need to shoot all of the requirements bubbas and engineers, and get on with cutting steel. Diamond designs are often based on a specific set of threat requirements that have a fleeting duration - what I term a fragile design rather than a robust, rigorous design - like trying to dance on a pin point where any small change in the forcing function renders it a waste of time and national treasure.
I agree that “better” keeps becoming the standard even when “good enough for the mission” would be the more useful answer.
That was a good part of what I was getting at in. Not every ship needs to be a diamond. Sometimes it needs to be a real, buildable design with a clear purpose, controlled changes, and numbers behind it.
Thanks for reading!
Yup. "Good enough for the mission" with enough flexibility (not necessarily "modularity" to adapt to conditions as they change.
Before we cut steel, we need to freeze the design. Change orders will still happen, but they must be necessary to the correction of a design problem that needs to be solved rather than allowing the good idea fairy to run rampant and allow the Navy to make changes simply because there is some capability they want to add now. Modes can be made later and in most cases they will be made cheaper after the ship has been in service for a period of time.
As an Engineer, I can testify that change orders are expensive. They should be issued only when absolutely necessary.
Concur. My second ship was DD-973. Rather than make CIWS a late-add mod to the original construction contract, it became part of the post-construction SRA. Seeing that whole process and the things that had gone wrong in my first ship’s ROH are a big part of what led me to becoming an Engineering Duty Officer.
I don't disagree. My feeling is we need to get to good enough, freeze the design, and build.
If we aim for perfect before we freeze the design, it becomes the enemy of good.
If we keep changing the design as we build, we just complicate things to the point of disruption.
I think a primary design characteristic of all future ships should be modularity. Weapons positions should be supplied with an over abundance of power, cooling, and data connectivity and the surrounding structure designed to accommodate the highest potential load. Compatibility requirements should be pushed to the weapon system modules. Modularity could even be extended to crew compartments, under the assumption that crew size is mission dependent, and unneeded crew space could be used for other purposes.
Modularity has proven that it needs to be proven before being applied to warships. Stacking combat capability is not the same as stacking shipping containers.
Do you know what the problems were?
Thats a good question. Looking at successful modular implementation, like StanFlex....the modules tended to be installed and stay there. Which begs the question; what did the modularity achieve? Operationally, StanFlex had a greater chance of success under the operating paradigm of Norway's Navy versus the paradigm of the US fleet. It helps that StanFlex modules themselves were relatively small modules...really more of a very large cell/magazine with extra features. Is it really worth building a ship with the tradeoffs in complexity, capability, weight, structural integrity to achieve very large structural percentage 'modularity'? That is unproven. Modularity is not a cause of the LCS issues, but it didn't help the LCS to be successful in terms of system capability. Not to mention the logistics constraints for a globally operating Navy. What happens with these modules when not installed? The USN already has a problem with maintenance/repair of assets afloat. Now throw a fleet of "modules" at that problem...modules that are not likely to be swapped out a lot, especially because there are no operating priniciples for operational module management. Even if the USN adopts and enacts a 'ready positioned module fleet' around the world...will that really achieve more from less? The Nissan Pulsar NX was sort of interesting in it's modularity concept, but in the driveway, modularity became more of a headache or an "oh yeah, I never change it".
Looking at this a little more, it looks like containerized on deck modules are becoming a thing. These include SF Defense’s “The Cube, the US MK 70 system, the future ECV, and the Naval Groups MPLS. Containers makes more sense for ease of employment on existing ships, and future ships could be designed to better accommodate a wider variety of containers with the proper electrical, cooling, power and comms capacity and connections.
I'd rather reinstate the VLS on ALL the San Antonios. The space is there. They managed to set it on fire on the USS New Orleans. And if we're giving them 16 strike-length cells, I'd not put NSM on them. I'd rather put TLAM as NSM would require them to get far too close to shore for land-attack.
I can certainly get behind the VLS on all the San Antionos to be sure. And for the LPDs operating with the big deck amphibs, I have no issue with them loading with Tomahawks, as the proposal gives those formations built-in escorts.
-Thanks for reading!
The real question is, do you feel this usage of the 6 presence ships is appropriate now that it has been fully laid out?
The answer is: "it's complicated".
The author is trying to solve the problem of USN ships getting endlessly extended at sea by providing some flavor of 'gap-filler' ship that does a portion of the job that an existing ship-type provides. I would like to solve the same problem. However, I see the issue from a different standpoint.
Author sees the issue as being the use of something like an ARG or CSG to play patty-cake with local powers while sailing around. He would like to hand off the patty-cake mission to a 'lesser' ship of some sort or a 'differently configured' ship in this case. Then he would 'focus' the remaining 'heavy assets' on pure war.
I see the issue as being we don't have enough ships to do the amount of 'pure war' that we have asked them to do. What kills your ships' lifespans and wrecks your maintenance accounts is that combat typically results in ships getting extended over and over and over (See Gerry Ford.) Having more ships to 'slot in' means that you don't have your ships in-combat for as long a period.
If I have 16 carriers, that guarantees I can deploy 4 at a time. I can have possibly 4 more standing by to deploy and replace the 4 who're at war. In a fight with a small power, I'll probably use at least two and possibly 3 of those ships, and I'll have one spare. For example, the USN fought Desert Storm with 4 carriers 'on-station' continuously for months. At the same time, we had enough strength to deter the Soviets and do other things.
But we don't have that force anymore.
We can reliably muster 2 carriers with the likelihood (in a good year) of mustering a third. We don't have the back-bench needed to reliably sortie spares to replace those two carriers, which is why the carriers get extended over and over and over.
The original plan was to be able to fight two 'Desert Storms' at once but we are not even able to do that. We can realistically fight ONE Desert Storm and try to buffalo any other countries feeling froggy into not acting at that time.
And that brings me to why I do not agree with the author's concept. Building a specialized ship for the patty-cake role still leaves you only reliably able to field enough assets to MAYBE fight one Desert Storm at a time. E.g. he would let the number of 'full' carriers drop to 9. So by the 4-1 rule, you have 2 available and if the stars align favorably you might get a 3rd, though that is unlikely.
Where would I go? I would find ways to make our ships less pricey, so we can simply have more of them. I do like some of the author's ideas on trying to hold the line on cost of our ships. E.g. does everybody need full SPY-6(V1)? Does a carrier need EASR? Can we relax some of the constricting damage-control regs that killed Constellation to arrive at a cheaper hull?
Currently, a Flt 3 Burke costs upwards of $2.2billion. How much could we shave from that cost? Once upon a time, we had Burkes, Ticos, and Spru-cans. Spru-can was the low-end destroyer. Could we build a Spru-can with EASR and only 48-64 VLS to the tune of 30ish ships? Then reserve a much more limited set of high-end destroyers (say 30-40ish) for high-end jobs?
Can we build a gas-turbine powered Ford-lite with maybe two or three EMALS (something like the Fujian or the proposed PA02 version of the QE)? The Brits can run a QE with 1600 guys. They got the QEs for something like the cost of a couple of Burkes. Could we get four or five of those and get back to 16 carriers? I'd keep them in home waters and let the nuke boats do what they're doing now. If a contingency starts, I can sortie the gas-turbine ships out to the fight as backup to let the nuke boats rest. In that scenario, I can plan for the tankers to refuel them.
So, bottom line, I'm still skeptical of his concept of a 'presence ship'. He's trying to solve the problems that are eating USN maintenance and op-tempo alive, but I'd do it a different way. Still.
There’s a lot in there I agree with, especially on cost and the need for more hulls. At a certain point, if every ship is built to the highest possible standard, you end up with too few ships to do the job, and that shows up exactly in the extension and maintenance problems you’re describing.
Where I think we differ is less on the problem and more on how to solve it. I’m not looking to reduce warfighting capacity so much as change how it’s structured and used. The carrier piece is probably the clearest example. Going from 11 CVNs to 9 CVNs is not meant to accept less presence, but to pair them with CVLs and manage the force differently so you end up with more available decks and less constant extension on the nuclear ships.
Same idea applies more broadly. Some of what you’re getting at with lower-cost destroyers and holding the line on systems is very much in line with how I’m thinking about the fleet. Not everything needs to be a top-end ship if the mission doesn’t demand it.
So I think we’re actually pretty close on the underlying issues. I’m just trying to address both the size of the force and how it’s being used at the same time.
Thanks for the thoughtful comment.
Countries when they see the Multi tool LPD in your new fleet: :)
Countries when they see any other ship in your fleet design: :o
Quick question though, maybe to be answered next week, what did you mean by "numbered fleets" when dispersing the ESB? Either way, Can't wait for the next instalment.
1st Fleet, 2nd Fleet, 3rd Fleet, etc. A numbered fleet is assigned to a major area of USN interest. E.g. the 7th Fleet is based in Japan and manages most Western Pacific-related affairs.
Okay so this is based on the existing fleet structure. Rodger rodger
To the author's point, we have two geriatric command ships. The other ships have quietly aged out of the system and never been replaced.
I'm not sure using the existing ESBs is the way to go. I'd rather build a dedicated ship to do the job and leave the ESBs to their multi-tool job of supporting SOCOM and Mine Warfare, etc. We could build a few command ships off the existing (hot) ESB line, rather than taking SOCOMs toy from them. But, to the author's point, we should not be trying to run navy ops from a land facility that is getting shelled by Shaheds.
I do personally like the idea of SOCOM and the fleet command on the same ship, as the increased coordination the could result from that pairing is an advantage.
I can also see the value in your approach here as well.
Thanks for reading!