I think what I like most about your vision is the consistent cycling and partnership of vessels. The predictability around availability and clear asset grouping actually provide a greater overall flexibility while maximizing the value of training. You'll almost always need these groups of capabilities, so it makes a lot of sense to package them upfront.
The consistency and predictability are really what make the whole thing work. If you know what’s available and how it’s grouped, you can plan and train to it in a way that’s much harder to do when everything is ad hoc.
Once again, I kind of don't really like your 'presence' ship concept. For me, if it doesn't really fit into the picture with the 'big war', we shouldn't spend money on it.
Counter-proposal. Instead of a 'Patrol LPD', if you're going to do a purpose-built ship, make it more in line with the UK's proposed 'Multi-Role Strike Ship'. Put some VLS tubes and other items on it to support the landing force organically and configure it with those nifty Swedish fast boats instead of LCACS and LCMs.
In the 'big war' this would then be used for raiding on the periphery of the theater, while still being useful for your 'engagement' task. It essentially bridges the gap between the ESBs, which are great for engagement in 'peace' time but basically sitting ducks in a big war, and a hard-core assault asset.
Pete Blaber, who spent 13 years as an officer in Delta, stated that ground forces need to be commanded at the ground level, and higher TOCs and JOCs should be support and planning structures, not command structures. He detailed multiple engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq where staff officers staring at video feeds were overriding ground commanders because they thought the Predator feed gave them total situational awareness.
Feels similar to trying to convince a bunch of 3 and 4 star admirals to inject some common sense into their planning for force sustainment and projection. They came up through a broken systems that was very good to them, so they’re disincentivized to correct it.
I think what I like most about your vision is the consistent cycling and partnership of vessels. The predictability around availability and clear asset grouping actually provide a greater overall flexibility while maximizing the value of training. You'll almost always need these groups of capabilities, so it makes a lot of sense to package them upfront.
The consistency and predictability are really what make the whole thing work. If you know what’s available and how it’s grouped, you can plan and train to it in a way that’s much harder to do when everything is ad hoc.
That’s where the flexibility actually comes from.
Thanks for reading!
Like too many ideas listed by Commander Salamander, this suffers from too much sense to get done.
I hear you... but if we don;t try to get ideas out there, we have even less of a chance..,
Once again, I kind of don't really like your 'presence' ship concept. For me, if it doesn't really fit into the picture with the 'big war', we shouldn't spend money on it.
Counter-proposal. Instead of a 'Patrol LPD', if you're going to do a purpose-built ship, make it more in line with the UK's proposed 'Multi-Role Strike Ship'. Put some VLS tubes and other items on it to support the landing force organically and configure it with those nifty Swedish fast boats instead of LCACS and LCMs.
In the 'big war' this would then be used for raiding on the periphery of the theater, while still being useful for your 'engagement' task. It essentially bridges the gap between the ESBs, which are great for engagement in 'peace' time but basically sitting ducks in a big war, and a hard-core assault asset.
Pete Blaber, who spent 13 years as an officer in Delta, stated that ground forces need to be commanded at the ground level, and higher TOCs and JOCs should be support and planning structures, not command structures. He detailed multiple engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq where staff officers staring at video feeds were overriding ground commanders because they thought the Predator feed gave them total situational awareness.
Feels similar to trying to convince a bunch of 3 and 4 star admirals to inject some common sense into their planning for force sustainment and projection. They came up through a broken systems that was very good to them, so they’re disincentivized to correct it.